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I have written several papers for BPEA (2002; 1996; 1982) looking at the relation of
multiple equation quantitative economic models to the process of monetary policy
making. When the ﬁrst of these papers was written, the impact of the rational expec-
tations critique in undermining academic interest in quantitative modeling for mon-
etary policy was apparent. Many, maybe most, economists took the Lucas critique
to imply that the month-to-month business of choosing monetary policy actions in
the light of current information was trivial or irrelevant. Economists were thought to
have nothing useful to say about it. Economists were supposed to contemplate only
the choice of policy “rules”, which were modeled as functions mapping the state of
the economy into policy actions.
The main point of the 1982 paper was that the regularly recurring task of choos-
1ing policy actions was neither easy nor unimportant, and indeed that there is no
other form of policy choice — “rules”, if they can be changed, are themselves policy
actions. The paper suggested methods to use a reliable probability model to evalu-
ate conditional projections, and applied the methods to a VAR model to determine
that the then-current policy projections by the Council of Economic Advisers made
no sense. But it provided little constructive criticism of the models then in use for
policy projection.
Central bank modelers by then had the idea that, to get academic respect, they
should build rational expectations into their models. The VAR modeling style dis-
playedinthe1982paperprovidedfewhooksonwhichtohangrationalexpectations.
Some central banks and regional Federal Reserve banks estimated VAR forecasting
models, but nowhere did they become the central modeling tool for policy discus-
sions.
Fourteen years later, I co-authored with Eric Leeper and Tao Zha another paper
on monetary policy models. By then, a substantial literature modeling monetary
policy and its effects with structural VAR’s had arisen. The robust ﬁndings of that
literature were that
• Monetary policy in most countries and periods is best modeled as an interest-
rate-setting rule:
• Most variation in monetary policy instruments consists of systematic reaction
to the state of the economy. Random disturbances to monetary policy existed,
but they explained little of observed business cycle variation.
• Output responds with a lag, and prices with an even longer lag, to monetary
2policy actions. The shapes of these estimated responses conditioned policy
discussion and were used as calibration targets by non-VAR modelers.
The 1996 surveyed the SVAR literature and suggested by example how SVAR’s
could be expanded to a scale closer to that of central bank policy models. The paper
still provided no hooks on which to hang Lucas-critique-repellent, though, and it
made no connection to what was actually going on in central bank modeling, which
was not SVAR based. SVAR’s and VAR’s were used as auxiliary tools in many central
banks, but they nowhere became the central focus for policy discussion.
In 2002 I visited four central banks and interviewed research staff, plus a few
policy board members. The banks’ models, which were in regular use as part of
the month by month routine of preparing forecasts and “scenario” analysis, were in-
corporating Lucas critique repellent, but at the expense of abandoning any claim to
being probability models of the data. In the BPEA paper that came out of the inter-
views, I criticized this new generation of central bank models, but I also criticized the
academic econometric and macro literature, which took no interest in policy model-
ing and had little guidance to offer policy modelers. The paper argued that getting
back to credible probability models was feasible and important. It is the only way
to allow clear discussion of uncertain contingencies in a way relevant to decision-
making. At the end of the paper I pointed to some promising developments, in-
cluding a paper out of the ECB (Smets and Wouters, 2003) that demonstrated the
feasibility of constructing a monetary policy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model and producing a distribution over the uncertain values of the model
parameters (a uniquely Bayesian notion).
It is perhaps worth restating what it means to say that these models have aban-
3doned any claim to being probability models of the data. The models are presented
with coefﬁcients estimated from data and with standard errors on these estimates.
But the estimates are obtained one equation at a time, or in some cases for small sub-
systems of two or three equations. In the Federal Reserve board’s FRBUS model, for
example, there is a standard single-equation speciﬁcation applied to many variables
that assumes no within-quarter interactions among variables. There are nonetheless
some contemporaneous cross-variable effects (e.g. current income on non-durable
consumption) that imply joint determination of blocks of variables, and this is ig-
nored in estimation. The model does imply a joint distribution for the time series
data, but this distribution is not calculated (at least in published descriptions of the
modelthatIhavebeenabletoﬁnd)anditsmatchtothedatanotexamined. Themain
publication (Harrison, Nikolov, Quinn, Ramsay, Scott, and Thomas, 2005) describ-
ing BEQM, the new Bank of England model, does not indicate how the model could
imply a distribution for the data; it postulates an unobservable “core”, to which ob-
servable variables are related by estimated equations, but the probability model for
the core is not laid out. A subsequent paper (Alvarez-Lois, Harrison, Piscitelli, and
Scott, 2005) suggests how BEQM could be treated as a probability model for the data,
but does not actually do so.
There are two related reasons why it is important that policy models be prob-
ability models. One is scientiﬁc, and was laid out years ago by Haavelmo (1944):
Economic models will make forecast errors; unless they are probability models, we
have no objective way to assess their accuracy, compare them to other models, or
improve them based on experience. The other is decision-theoretic: We estimate
these models to use them as aids to decision-making; policy-makers need to weigh
4the implications of the model against their own knowledge and judgment; this will
necessarily involve weighting model results by their reliability. A probability model
provides its own characterization of its reliability.
Of course monetary policy has been made without the aid of probability models,
and non-probability models have been constructed and used as accounting frame-
worksfororganizingpolicydiscussion. Justasﬁrmscanallocateresourcesinternally
without calculating the shadow price of every input at every moment, decision-
makers can make choices without an elaborate probability framework. But when
reasonably large groups of people, like central bank staffs and policy boards, need
to talk about uncertainty and relate large amounts of current and past data to the
current state of their uncertainty, the language of probability is the only clear means
of communication.
The Bayesian approach to inference pioneered by Smets and Wouters is central
to the reintegration of policy modeling with probability-based inference. It recog-
nizes the need for what has to go on daily in data-analysis for policy-making —
combination of information in the data with uncertain judgmental information from
decision-makers. It also can deal in a straightforward way with situations where the
number of unknown parameters is large, so that some are likely to be poorly pinned
down by the data. While these advantages of a Bayesian approach to inference have
long been understood, in recent years computational hardware and algorithmic de-
signs have progressed to make applying the approach much easier. (A somewhat
more expansive discussion of the advantages of explicit Bayesian models for mone-
tary policy appears in my (2007) paper.)
52 Today
The Bank of England’s BEQM model, which was still a research project in 2002, has
emerged. It is in the style of the Canadian QPM and the US FRBUS, in that it can
run in a “rational expectations” mode for scenario analysis, and also in that it aban-
dons any attempt to be a probability model for the data. But it is probably the last
of its breed. The ECB, the US Federal Reserve Board, several regional Feds and the
IMF, are among the policy institutions that have active projects to produce Bayesian
DSGE’s that can be used in the policy process. The Swedish Riksbank has a work-
ing Bayesian DSGE model, labeled RAMSES, that they described in 2005 publica-
tions and began in 2007 to use as the central model in their regular rounds of policy
discussion. RAMSES is ﬁt to 15 data series, has 21 distinct sources of random dis-
turbance, and 51 parameters. While this is not at the scale of the stochastic core of
FRBUS, which has about 40 distinct sources of disturbance, it suggests that with its
much larger staff and computing resources, it is reasonable to suppose the Fed could
apply these methods at the scale of FRBUS. There is a trend, in other words, toward
bringing probability modeling and policy modeling back together.
Therearesomefundamentalsdrivingthistrend. In2002Ipointedtothespreadof
inﬂation targeting and of transparency in the policy process as generating a demand
for probability-based policy models. When policy makers are required, as they are
in most inﬂation-targeting banks, to prepare regular, policy-board-approved, pro-
jections of inﬂation and business activity, they want model-based projections from
their staff. The model-based projections may be used mainly as a starting point for
discussion, but they provide a necessary focal point. Policy makers also want to be
6sure that projections include error bands, so that readers of the inﬂation report will
expect revisions of forecasts and not treat deviations from forecast paths of expected
absolute size as forecast failures. This leads to an appreciation of the value of models
that treat parameters explicitly as random and that can be assessed from an historical
record of forecast distributions and actual outcomes.
The error bands that are published now, even at the Riksbank, are based primar-
ily on the historical record of the bank’s forecast accuracy, not the model’s inter-
nally generated forecast accuracy measures. The central forecasts themselves are not
simply those produced by the model, but reﬂect judgmental input from the policy
board, so model-based error bands would necessarily be only a starting point for de-
termining the bands in the published fan charts. Nonetheless model-based analysis
of forecast uncertainty could provide important insights not available from the usual
use of historical data on forecast errors. Model-based analysis can answer questions
like, “What is the probability of two successive negative quarterly growth rates of
GDP in the next year?”, or the same question about CPI inﬂation. Depending on
the initial state of the economy, different parts of the model may be important for
determining forecast uncertainty; model-based error bands can take account of the
effects of such variations on uncertainty. And ﬁnally, models can put error bands on
projections that condition on particular policies or future disturbances, which is not
possible with a historical approach. It seems likely, therefore, that as experience with
the RAMSES model and its properties accumulates, its model-based error measures
may play a more central role.
The US Federal Reserve is of course one of the central banks that still has not
formally adopted inﬂation targeting. From the point of view of the developments
7described here, however, inﬂation targeting is important more for the nature of the
policy process it induces than for the presence of a numerical inﬂation target. The
Federal Reserve has for a long time provided semi-annual projections of inﬂation
and output growth generated from individual forecasts of Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) members. Chairman Bernanke has put more emphasis than did
his predecessor on these projections in his Congressional testimony, and he recently
announced that the projections will now be made quarterly, over a longer horizon,
and with explanations for the diversity of views they represent. Though these pro-
jections are still only for annual averages, this brings the Fed’s procedures close to
those of inﬂation-targeting banks. Because the projections will continue to be based
on individual FOMC member forecasts, the incentives to produce better, probabilis-
tic models may work their way back to individual regional Federal Reserve banks,
whose presidents will be serving on the FOMC.
Inﬂation targeting and the associated cycle of forecast revision and preparation
and inﬂation-report-writing is now widespread. The current frontier of controversy
is probably the question of whether central banks should publish forecasts of their
policy interest rates along with their forecasts of inﬂation and output. Just a few
central banks publish forecasts of their policy rates: New Zealand, Norway, and
Sweden. There is a good case for publishing policy rate forecasts. In most situations
where strong policy action is called for, the central bank will be planning a non-
constant path for the interest rate. If inﬂation is threatening, the bank will raise the
policy rate, expecting to be able to lower it to normal levels when inﬂation recedes.
If it has announced an expected path for rates, there is less danger that a foreseen,
normal rate reduction as inﬂation recedes will be misread as a loss of nerve. In a
8recession, the bank will lower the policy rate, expecting, and wanting the public
to believe, that it will raise rates as recovery proceeds to preclude inﬂation. Realistic
projections of output growth and inﬂation will assume such time paths for the policy
rate. A full explanation of the forecast, and even more so of the reasons forecasts are
changing in reaction to events, requires that the policy rate path be explicit.
One objection to publishing policy rate forecasts is the possibility that, despite
their being presented as fan charts and with explicit warning that they are likely
to be revised, the public might mistakenly regard them as ﬁxed commitments, so
that the central bank would lose credibility when it did not exactly follow the policy
rate path it had projected. In those countries that have started publishing policy
rate forecasts, this is not so far a problem. The central bank could lose credibility
if it changed its policy rate projections without explanation, or with inconsistent
or contradictory explanations, but this is exactly the appeal of making policy rate
forecasts public. Making the forecasts public helps to discipline the central bank and
and at the same time helps the public distinguish policy changes made as part of a
systematic reaction to the state of the economy from any possible erratic component
in policy.
In the US, the objection is made that the FOMC is much bigger than the policy
boards at the central banks that publish policy rate forecasts. It is said therefore to
be impossible for the committee to agree on a path for the policy rate — dozens of
numbers, instead of the single number that represents the current policy rate. This
objection is probably overdone. Discussion is likely to focus on a few dimensions
of variation in the path, mainly more or less rapid increase or decrease in the rate,
not on month-by-month ﬁnd detail of it. The complexity of the decision making is
9therefore only modestly increased. In any case, the procedure already in place to
develop summaries of the collection of projections from individual FOMC members
could easily be extended to include Federal Funds rate forecasts.
3 The rules vs. discretion debate revisited
As I pointed out at the start, part of the reason academic research on policy models
shriveled was the notion that only policy “rules” matter, so that the normal business
of monetary policy, changing policy variables in reaction to the state of the economy,
came to seem to be unimportant.
Figure 1 shows the main fan charts from a recent Riksbank Monetary Policy Report.
The report includes also a variety of alternative projections, conditioned on tighter
or looser monetary policy and on possible external disturbances, and explains why
projections have changed since the previous report.
Which is more likely to generate public conﬁdence in and understanding of mon-
etary policy:
• An announced Taylor rule, with coefﬁcients speciﬁed to 4 decimal places, or
• Experience with reports like the Riksbank semi-annual report, explaining cur-
rent and future policy, showing paths not chosen as well as paths chosen, and
explaining how projected paths of policy rates change over time and why they
do so?
Formally, both are “rules” mapping current information into policy actions. But the
one speciﬁed indirectly is more understandable, and more likely to retain credibility
10Figure 1: Main fan charts from the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Report 2007:1
11when unusual conditions arise. The process of making policy projections, discussing
them, choosing among them, and explaining the choice, is probably resulting in a
more stable and credible policy “rule” than the k% rules or ﬁxed reaction functions
economists usually think of when they talk of a “policy rule”.
The original argument for focusing on policy rules seems to have turned inside
out. By being more careful, precise, forward-looking, and transparent about the
ordinary business of monetary policy — changing policy variables in reaction to
the state of the economy — central banks seem to be coming close to the ideal of
implementing a widely understood and stable policy rule.
4 Future Prospects
Though the new style of DSGE models ﬁt to data are a major step forward, there is
plenty of room for further progress. The modeling technology that has now been
widely mastered deals with linearized models. For long run projections, or for analy-
sis of situations where the lower bound on nominal interest rates could be binding,
for example, accounting for nonlinearities could be important. Linearized models
cannot explain time varying risk premia, which are essential if the model is to incor-
porate a rich set of asset markets. Methods for inference in nonlinear DSGE models
are for now many times more burdensome computationally and not practical for real
time policy modeling, but they are an important research frontier.
Central bank modelers, having seen a speciﬁcation that in some sense works,
are imitating each other, but some of the most common elements of the models are
questionable. The models generate price and/or wage stickiness from a small bag of
12stylized New Keynesian tricks. These are “micro-founded” speciﬁcations that do be-
gin with optimizing theory, but cannot be connected realistically to micro data. To ﬁt
well, the models have to introduce a lot of inertia — “habit formation” in consump-
tion and adjustment costs in investment, for example. Many economists regard these
models of inertia as thinly disguised empirical adjustments that are not plausible as
actual descriptions of tastes or technology. It would be good to see some competi-
tion among models with different ways of accounting for observed sluggishness in
macroeconomic behavior, though it seems likely that different models of inertia will
ﬁt the data about equally well despite having different implications about welfare
effects of monetary policy. Some of the criticism of empirical DSGE’s on this score
fails to recognize that using a model that does not account for observed sluggishness
is not an option.
The models in most cases include adjustments to some optimization conditions
— most prominently the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition. For an open
economy like Sweden, the UIP condition is crucial to the model dynamics. RAM-
SES makes one of these ad hoc adjustments. It improves the model’s performance
in various dimensions, but it raises questions about the model’s interpretation. De-
viations from UIP are treated as affected by interest rates, but as unrelated to other
parts of the economy. If the deviations were in fact “risk premia” (which is what
they are called), one might expect that they would increase at the same time that
other risk premia do. There is even some work by Hau and Rey (2003) suggesting
that this might be the case. Ignoring the cross-dependence would be inaccurate, but
including it creates a major channel of impact of monetary policy that runs outside
the general equilibrium modeling framework.
13The ad hoc inertia and UIP shocks may be symptomatic of a broader problem:
models in this style, in which aggregates are treated as if they were single homo-
geneous commodities and all agents optimize, continuously and perfectly, may in
these empirical DSGE’s be reaching the limits of their range of usefulness. It might
be better to recognize that the stories the models tell about optimizing agents are
only useful approximations. One common way to do this is to treat the observed
data as the DSGE model variables plus “error” that is unrelated to the economically
interpretable disturbances that drive the DSGE. This approach, though, leaves us
with no principles to guide assumptions about the properties of the “error”, and
furthermore leaves policy actions modeled as affecting unobserved model variables,
not the actual variables that the public and policy-makers care about.
A more useful, though similarly motivated, idea is to use the DSGE as a way to
generate probabilistic restrictions on the behavior of a model in the structural VAR
style. The VAR-style model applies to the actual data, and its equations and distur-
bances have behavioral interpretations. But a prior distribution pulls the VAR-style
model toward the shape of the linearized DSGE model, which has similarly inter-
preted equations and disturbances. In this setting, the DSGE is freed from having
to match in detail the inertial aspects of short-run behavior, while at the same time
it can pull the VAR-style model toward reasonable long run behavior. Ingram and
Whiteman (1994) proposed a similar idea, applied to non-structural VAR’s, a long
time ago. DelNegro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2006) have made the idea
practical for SVAR’s and for models at the scale of the recent empirical DSGE’s. This
approach seems promising and deserving of extension.
So there’s plenty of difﬁcult and interesting research ahead in this area. But the
14intellectual sociology that has in the past led academic macroeconomists to ﬁnd rea-
sons not to be interested in policy-oriented research is still in operation. While there
is some academic attention to these issues, there seems to be less than warranted
by their importance and inherent interest. It may be the ﬁeld requires more invest-
ment in technique and more teamwork than most, making it relatively less attractive
to the non-tenured researcher needing a “home run” paper. Central bank research
staffs work under time pressure and have to focus mainly on known technology.
They also may develop vested interests in the methods and models they know. In-
terest and criticism from outsiders is therefore important. Sustaining it may require
developing new institutions of cooperation between academics and central banks.
5 Conclusion
Monetary policy institutions in which policy makers and modelers regularly inter-
act, using probability and decision-theoretic language, seem for the time being to be
spreading. I’ve explained that there are reasons to think this way of doing policy
really is better, and therefore might persist and spread further. This is not inevitable,
though.
• The Academy could lose interest, stop producing people who are trained well
in inference and data analysis as well as economics.
• Acentralbankattheforefrontofthenewmethodscouldproduce, orbeblamed
for, a bad macroeconomic outcome.
• A lot of decisions are made under uncertainty every day by people who don’t
15even know what a probability is. It could turn out that having a highly trained
staff who can discuss uncertainty in probability language is not enough help to
be worth the expense.
We’ll see.
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